Aircraft loss of control (LOC) is a leading cause of fatal accidents across all transport airplane and operational classes. LOC can result from a wide spectrum of precursors (or hazards), often occurring in combination. Technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery must therefore be effective under a wide variety of conditions and uncertainties, including multiple hazards, and the validation process must provide a means of assessing system effectiveness and coverage of these hazards. This paper provides a detailed description of a methodology for analyzing LOC as a dynamics and control problem for the purpose of developing effective technology solutions. The paper includes a definition of LOC based on several recent publications, a detailed description of a refined LOC accident analysis process that is illustrated via selected example cases, and a description of planned follow-on activities for identifying future potential LOC risks and the development of LOC test scenarios. Some preliminary considerations for LOC of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and for their safe integration into the National Airspace System (NAS) are also discussed.
The development and validation of technologies for LOC prevention and recovery poses significant challenges. Aircraft LOC can result from a wide spectrum of precursor events and hazards, often occurring in combination 4 , which cannot be fully replicated during evaluation. Technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery must therefore be effective (i.e., resilient) under a wide variety of conditions and uncertainties, including multiple LOC precursors and hazards, and the validation process must provide some measure of assurance that the new vehicle safety technologies do no harm -i.e., that they themselves do not introduce new safety risks.
Onboard systems technologies have been developed by NASA as part of a holistic approach for LOC prevention and recovery. 5, 6 A validation framework involving analysis, simulation, and experimental testing has also been developed by NASA for safety-critical integrated systems operating under hazardous conditions that can lead to LOC 7, 8 , and a preliminary set of LOC test scenarios 9 was developed based on a limited set of flight accidents. Preliminary analysis results have been reported 10 for a comprehensive set of transport aircraft accidents over a recent 15-year period (1996 -2010) , including a methodology for the identification of worst-case combinations of causal and contributing factors and how they sequence in time. This analysis, when complete, will be used in the development of a set of LOC test scenarios that can be used in the validation of onboard systems technologies for LOC prevention and recovery. Since enhanced engineering simulations are required for batch and piloted evaluations under realistic LOC precursor conditions, these test scenarios also serve as a high-level requirement for defining the simulation enhancements needed for generating realistic LOC test scenarios.
Since publication of the preliminary analysis results for transport aircraft (see Ref. 11) , the analysis process has been substantially refined and is being applied to the transport accidents and incidents identified in Ref. 11 as well as for the analysis of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) mishaps (i.e., accidents and incidents). Refinement of the methodology includes the addition of LOC precursors, the addition of flags for quickly identifying key issues of interest for LOC, the identification of potential research solutions for each accident (if applicable), and the capture of specific comments for each precursor. Each precursor comment is taken from the accident report and specifies why each precursor is included in the sequence. This paper provides a detailed summary of this refined analysis methodology and provides some examples to illustrate it. Section II presents an overview of recent definitions for transport aircraft LOC as well as the refined LOC problem definition used in performing the analysis. Section III provides a detailed description of the refined LOC accident analysis process, which is illustrated via selected example cases. Individual hazards occurrences are also summarized in Section III for the mishaps analyzed to date. Section IV describes the analysis products resulting from this work as well as follow-on research to identify future potential LOC risks and develop hazards-based test scenarios for use in the development and validation of technology solutions for LOC prevention and recovery. Section V presents a discussion of the importance of LOC prevention and recovery for future resilient and autonomous systems as well as some preliminary considerations based on this work for the safe integration of UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS). Section VI provides a summary of the paper and some concluding remarks.
II. Aircraft Loss-of-Control (LOC) Problem Definition
LOC can be described as motion that is: outside the normal operating flight envelopes; not predictably altered by routine pilot control inputs; characterized by nonlinear effects, such as kinematic/inertial coupling; disproportionately A large responses to small state variable changes, or oscillatory/divergent behavior; likely to result in high angular rates and displacements; and characterized by the inability to maintain heading, altitude, and wings-level flight.
11 LOC also includes situations in which the flight path is outside of acceptable tracking tolerances and cannot be predictably controlled by pilot (or autoflight system) inputs. 12 LOC is therefore fundamentally a dynamics and control problem. It is important to note that LOC need not be unrecoverable, but if left unaddressed it may become unrecoverable. LOC is also a complex problem in that there are many causal and contributing factors that can lead to LOC (see Refs. 5 & 11) . The primary causes include: entry into a vehicle upset condition; reduction or loss of control power; changes to the vehicle dynamic response in relation to handling/flying qualities; and combinations of these causes. There are numerous factors that have historically led or contributed to LOC. These can be grouped into three major categories: adverse onboard conditions, external hazards and disturbances, and abnormal flight conditions (or vehicle upsets). LOC causal and contributing factors within these categories are summarized in Fig. 1 . Adverse onboard conditions include vehicle problems (i.e., impairment, failures, or damage) and inappropriate crew response. External hazards and disturbances consist of inclement weather conditions, atmospheric disturbances, and obstacles that require abrupt maneuvering for avoidance. Vehicle upset conditions include a variety of off-nominal or extreme flight conditions and abnormal trajectories. The complexity of LOC is clearly illustrated in Fig. 1 , particularly considering that many LOC accidents involve combinations of the causal and contributing factors that are listed. Onboard systems of the future must therefore be developed to provide LOC prevention and recovery capabilities under a wide variety of hazards (and their combinations) that can lead to LOC. An integrated system concept for accomplishing this was presented in Ref. 6 . The validation of technologies developed for loss of control (LOC) prevention and recovery, such as that of Ref. 6 , poses significant challenges. The validation process must provide some measure of assurance that the new vehicle safety technologies are effective and that they do no harm -i.e., that they themselves do not introduce new safety risks. Moreover, a means of assessing hazards coverage must also be included in the validation framework. A validation framework involving analysis, simulation, and experimental testing was previously developed for safety-critical integrated systems operating under hazardous conditions that can lead to LOC (see Refs. 8 & 9) , and a preliminary set of LOC test scenarios was developed (see Ref. 10 ) based on a limited accident set.
III. LOC Accident Analysis Methodology and Example Cases
This section presents a detailed methodology for the analysis of aircraft accidents and incidents, with the purpose of developing technology solutions for LOC prevention and recovery. The accident / incident set includes inflight LOC (LOC-I) accidents as categorized by the CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team 13 as well as other LOC accidents (e.g., resulting from control component failures and/or vehicle damage sufficient to alter vehicle dynamics and control characteristics) related to the definition of Section II but not typically included in the LOC-I accident category. Refinement of the analysis methodology includes the addition of LOC precursors, the addition of flags for quickly identifying key issues of interest for LOC, the identification of potential research solutions for each accident (if applicable), and the capture of specific comments for each precursor. Each precursor comment is taken from the accident report or supporting information and specifies why each precursor is included in the sequence. In some cases, consensus comments by the analysis team have been added to enhance clarity. This section provides a detailed summary of this refined analysis methodology and provides some examples to illustrate it.
A. Accident Set Definition
Air carrier upset accidents were reviewed for the period 1996 through 2010. All reported mishaps to airplanes certified under Transport Category or Commuter Category were considered. The following databases were reviewed: Database coded event fields and narratives were queried for event categories and/or keywords such as "loss-ofcontrol," "upset," "unusual attitude," "stall," "crash out of control," and "uncontrolled descent." All resulting database records and accident reports were reviewed by the authors to determine applicability to the study. Military airplanes and accidents resulting from criminal or deliberate activities (e. g., Egyptair 990) or pilot incapacitation (e. g., Helios 522) were culled from the list. Test operations were not considered nor were engine-out ferry flights, although positioning flights were included.
The full accident / incident set is provided in Appendix A. Some general statistics associated with the LOC accident / incident set of this study are summarized below in terms of number of events (or mishaps) and fatalities (onboard and ground) relative to phase of flight, aircraft type, operation, and five-year intervals. Takeoff and Initial Climb  85  1511  94  Climb  44  1767  33  Cruise  43  2008  78  Descent  17  157  0  Holding  2  0  0  Approach  47  805  23  VFR Pattern  2  5  0  Circling  3  175  0  Landing  18 
B. Accident Analysis Methodology
The accident analysis methodology was based on the sequential precursor model, which defines an accident as a series of connected events that ultimately lead to an undesired outcome. If a precursor event can be eliminated by an intervention, the accident/incident can be prevented. For this study, the methodology was designed to identify dominant precursors for each accident and the associated temporal sequencing. In contrast to typical root cause analysis, the precursors were selected by identifying all relevant hazards that sequentially led to the mishap (as opposed to the primary / root cause) to better understand LOC more holistically as a multiple-hazards event and thereby enable the development of research and technology interventions that are effective across a wide spectrum of key LOC hazards and their combinations (as opposed to developing separate technologies that target a single hazard). The precursors, shown in Table 2 , were defined by the team based on the previous accident analysis of references 5-6 and were further updated during the analysis process. The wording of each precursor was carefully defined to correlate with terminology typically seen in accident reports and to minimize ambiguities. Some precursors, such as those under "Vehicle Upset," were derived from recent references (e.g., Refs. 4, 12) and further, more specific definitions may warrant additional research. An important distinction with this analysis was that the goal was to identify potential technology interventions that merit further research, rather than the root cause or specific near-term interventions. Therefore some accidents were included in the database that did not clearly fit the specific definition of a LOC event but contained important precursor information that added substantially to the analysis or should be considered for future analysis. The analysis was based solely on publicly-available formal accident reports and associated supporting documents when available. For example, knowledge of sub-system design and performance specific to the aircraft was included when appropriate to clarify the precursor or temporal sequencing. Each accident was reviewed and precursors identified in a consensus format and the results were recorded in a spreadsheet document to facilitate data analysis.
An illustration of the analysis spreadsheet used in the analysis process is provided in Appendix B. The team based the precursor analysis on the published information verbatim and did not inject additional analysis or conclusions. In some cases the accident reports were very limited, which resulted in minimal identified precursors. The temporal sequencing was established by assigning a number to the precursors and in some cases a precursor may have occurred more than once. In most cases, the ending precursor was under the category of "Vehicle Upset Conditions". Because some precursors were somewhat broad in definition, the associated text that was used to justify that precursor was included in the database for completeness and further analysis.
As part of the database, three broad technology categories were flagged for potential relevance to the accident, 1) crew distraction, 2) human-machine interface, and 3) mitigation through research including training. These categories, though not specific precursors, were included due to numerous important and recent studies to address these areas but which were not necessarily addressed in the accident reports. In addition, comments were included to highlight important aspects of the accident that were not necessarily included in a precursor.
Once the precursor sequences are identified, an analysis can be performed to identify worst-case precursor combinations and precursor sequences. "Worst case" in this context is in terms of the number of accidents and fatalities. Worst case precursor combinations are identified using three-dimensional scatter plots with the three dimensions corresponding to the three precursor categories identified in Table 2 . The preliminary analysis results documented in Ref. 10 illustrated these scatter plots at the sub-category and precursor levels. An example from Ref.
10 is included in Appendix C for convenience. Worst-case precursor sequences can be identified using pivot tables in Excel. All sequences associated with an initiating precursor can be drawn with the number of associated accidents and fatalities for each sequence. Examples from Ref. 10 of worst case sequence identification are also included in Appendix C. Individual precursor statistics can also be computed, as illustrated in Ref. 10 and summarized for the mishaps analyzed to date in Subsection III-D.
C. Accident Analysis Example
To illustrate the potential use of the database and analysis methodology, an analysis of eight accidents and incidents involving blocked pitot tubes or static port is presented. Table 3 provides a summary of these accidents and incidents. A description of the sensor system failure causes, symptoms, and outcomes is summarized below for the above mishaps.
1 Causes of the Sensor System Failure:
a Four sensor system failure events were caused by pitot icing.
Pitot icing can affect all onboard air data systems, the pilot, copilot, and standby systems and all flight control systems that use air data. These include autopilots, flight directors, and some flight control functions.
Three of the failures were caused by inoperative pitot heat (either switched off or failed). One was caused by atmospheric conditions that were worse than pitot design requirements b Three failure events were caused by a single blocked pitot tube.
A single blocked pitot tube affects a single air data system, usually the pilot's or copilot's systems. In this case, there will be disagreement between the cockpit indications.
Two failures occurred after pitot covers were left off overnight. One failure was caused by an internal blockage.
c One failure event was caused by static ports being taped over by the maintenance crew.
Blocking all static ports affects all onboard air data systems, the pilot, copilot, and standby systems and all flight control systems that use air data. These include autopilots, flight directors, and some flight control functions. b One failure event resulted in the copilot, who was flying, seeing zero airspeed and immediately applying stall recovery which was intended for low altitude stalls and had the effect of causing loss of one slat which precluded recovery.
3 Differences between accidents and incidents a Four accidents showed extreme confusion (as described above) in the flight deck. The crews were still trying to sort out the situation when they crashed, killing all onboard.
b Three incidents showed the same confusion in the flight deck with the same indications. Fortunately for all onboard, the crew finally reverted to basic pitch and power control and safely recovered the airplanes.
Further analysis of these mishaps can be accomplished by identifying the precursor sequences and worst-case combinations associated with each accident and incident. Figure 2 illustrates the accident sequence determined for the Birgenair accident of 1996, which corresponds to Accident No. 2 in Table 3 . The blocks in the sequence represent accident precursors (or hazards) that led to this accident. The comments below each box are taken from the accident report to reflect the team rationale for inclusion of each precursor. These comments provide specific information from the accident or incident for each precursor / hazard in the sequence. The precursor sequences developed for the eight blocked pitot tube or static port mishaps of a. Three of the five (or 60%) are characterized by "Improper/Ineffective Recovery." This precursor could potentially be added to mishap #62 as well, but information is limited for this case. Adding it would make 4/5 (or 80%). b. One aircraft suffered structural damage that resulted in an inability to control the aircraft. The pilots likely could not make a proper recovery given the damage. c. All of the fatal events experienced a serious vehicle upset condition, with 80% (4/5) involving stall / departure and the fifth event involving uncontrolled descent. d. Three of the five fatal accidents (60%) involved flight deck instrumentation and/or auto-flight system issues (operational errors, inadequacy, etc.). e. In 4/5 cases (80%) there were also a "Loss of Awareness" issue in either aircraft / system state, energy, or attitude. 3) What's different about the nonfatal incident cases?
a. All three of these incidents (142, 188, and 254) led to vehicle upsets, although only one event involved vehicle stall, and the pilots were able to recover the aircraft. b. There were still pilot issues as all three had either an "Improper/Incorrect Procedure" or "Abnormal Control Input." c. Only one of the three (#254) had a "Lack of Aircraft System State Awareness," but this was limited to the mode switching that was occurring in the background.
In general, the fatal accidents appear to be more complicated (i.e., involving more precursors) than the nonfatal incidents. A comparison of event complexity can be performed by analyzing the worst case precursor combinations using 3-D scatter plots. Figure 3 shows the precursor combinations for the fatal accidents ( Figure 3a ) and nonfatal incidents (Figure 3b ). The axes represent Vehicle Hazards, External Hazards & Disturbances, and Crew Action / Inaction. These axes were selected to identify the hazards combinations involved in these mishaps, and to enable a more detailed identification of the specific hazards involved. Since all of these mishaps involved a sensor system failure (resulting from a blocked pitot tube or static port), this precursor is assumed and not included in 
) Nonfatal Incidents
Considering the fatal accidents first, it is easy to see from Figure 3a that there are many hazards combinations occurring for #2, #37, #260, and #14. Mishap #62 is the least complex in terms of hazards combinations, but this event involves snow/icing conditions, loss of state awareness by the crew, abnormal control inputs, and entry into stall. Mishap #14 involves multiple ineffective crew actions (improper pre-flight inspection, inadequate crew resource management, loss of state awareness, and ineffective recovery), flight deck instrumentation issues, and two serious upset conditions (stall / departure and uncontrolled descent). Accidents #2, #37, and #260 are the most complex, with #260 being both the most recent fatal accident and the most complex. All three of these events involve both flight deck instrumentation and autoflight system issues (operational errors, inadequacies, etc.), multiple crew hazards (including loss of state awareness, abnormal control inputs, and ineffective recovery), and stall / departure. Mishap #2 occurred under poor visibility conditions, #37 occurred under thunderstorms / rain conditions, and #260 involved both of these external hazards. Mishap #37 also involved vehicle impairment that resulted from an inappropriate configuration that led to structural damage and abnormal vehicle dynamics and control.
By comparison, the nonfatal incidents of Figure 3b are much less complex involving fewer hazards combinations. Incident #188 is the simplest event involving a single combination of snow / icing, abnormal control input, and abnormal attitude / trajectory. Incident #142 is slightly more complicated. Although there is no involvement by External Hazards & Disturbances, it does involve flight deck instrumentation and stall / departure, but only involves improper procedure by the crew. The final incident, #254, occurred under poor visibility conditions, involved the auto-flight system, two crew hazards (improper procedure and loss of state awareness), and abnormal attitude. The only stall event was not complicated further by inclement weather or poor visibility, nor by multiple instances of ineffective crew involvement. The other two incidents never entered into more severe vehicle upset conditions (such as stall / departure or controlled descent).
It is noted that very few incident investigations get the level of attention given to fatal accidents, but it would be difficult to quantify this difference (e.g., length of the report, length of the investigation, number of parties to the investigation, etc.) and thereby determine any potential impact this may have on complexity findings. It is also noted that the flight crews of the incidents were able to "break the chain" of events and thereby avert an accident. However, this could be either a cause or effect of less complexity. That is, less complex events may be easier for crews to identify and correct before they become an accident, or breaking the chain earlier in the sequence of events could prevent progression to a more highly complex event. Regardless, it is worth noting that the complexity of some circumstances make it less likely that crews will be able to correctly identify and correct the situation before it progresses too far.
The comments and flags included in the analysis process can also provide some insight into key issues and potential methods for mitigating through research. Tables of this data are contained in Appendix D. In three of the five fatal accidents, the crew was distracted or overwhelmed by conditions related to the pitot system failure (with one of these accidents exacerbated by the presence of cabin crew in the cockpit). Four of the five fatal accidents involved potential human-machine interface issues, with the accident report for the fifth accident lacking enough information to make this determination. In some cases the auto-flight system flew the aircraft into stall (due to the erroneous airspeed indications), and flight deck instrumentation provided little information for improved situation awareness and no guidance on appropriate actions to take. Moreover, in some instances multiple conflicting warnings and alerts were sounding simultaneously -which further confused the crew. In contrast, none of the non-fatal incidents involved crew distraction. Although the onboard systems provided similar opportunities for confusion or to further exacerbate the situation, the comparatively less complex hazards profile enabled the pilots to successfully recover to a safe flight condition.
Comparing the fatal and nonfatal mishaps of this study, it can be concluded that there is a level of hazards complexity at which pilots (or any human) become confused and are unable to respond effectively. Moreover, current systems are essentially designed for nominal conditions and either disengage or respond inappropriately (adding additional confusion to the situation). Some potential mitigation strategies to prevent these kinds of mishaps in the future are provided in the tables of Appendix D for each mishap, and summarized here as follows:
1. Improved pilot training relative to diagnosing and mitigating onboard system failures (including sensor system failures and use of alternate instrumentation); 2. Improved crew training under unexpected and abnormal conditions (including multiple hazards events) and in the implications of existing protections associated with system operational modes; 3. Sensor integrity management system capable of detecting, identifying and mitigating sensor system failures (including blocked pitot tube or static ports and common mode sensor failures); 4. Improved algorithms and displays that provide improved situational awareness to the systems and crew under multiple hazards conditions;
5. Resilient flight control system capable of ensuring flight safety under multiple hazards (including system failures, external disturbances, and inappropriate control inputs by the crew and/or autoflight systems); 6. Resilient upset recovery system capable of providing guidance for and/or automatic recovery from upset conditions (including stall) under multiple hazards conditions.
D. Individual Hazards Occurrences
To date, the team has analyzed 122 of the 278 mishaps in the set using the analysis approach described herein. Individual occurrences of the precursors / hazards, arranged by the categories identified in Table 2 External Hazards and Disturbances (see Figure 5 ) are dominated by night visibility issues at approximately 22%, with snow or icing occurring in a little more than 10% of the mishaps evaluated to date. Other key external hazards include thunderstorms / rain at 9%, moving obstacles at 8%, and visibility issues related to fog or haze at 7%.
Hazards associated with Abnormal Vehicle Dynamics and Upsets (see Figure 6 ) are dominated by uncontrolled descent (which occurred in approximately 34% of the mishaps analyzed thus far) and stall / departure (which occurred in approximately 30%). Other key hazards related to vehicle upset conditions include abnormal / unusual attitude and abnormal flight trajectory (each occurring in approximately 15% of the mishaps analyzed to date). Hazards related to abnormal vehicle dynamics occurred less frequently, with uncommanded motion occurring in approximately 8.5% of the mishaps analyzed thus far, followed by abnormal control and/or control asymmetry (6%), oscillatory vehicle response (4%), and abnormal or counterintuitive control response (2%).
Overall (i.e., looking at the entire set of plots in Figures 4 -6 ), it appears that a relatively high percentage of the accidents analyzed to date have involved the human element, Crew Action / Inaction. There is also a significant contribution of poor visibility under night conditions within the External Hazards & Disturbances category, and of events involving uncontrolled descent and stall / departure under the Vehicle Upsets sub-category. This may indicate the need for improved systems that better account for human involvement and provide improved man/machine interfaces.
IV. Accident Analysis Products and Follow-On Research
Analysis products will be made available from the process of Section III, and follow-on research is planned for the identification of future potential safety risks related to LOC and the development of LOC test scenarios based on the current and future hazards sets and their analysis. The analysis products and follow-on research are described in the following subsections.
A. Aircraft Accident Analysis Products
A goal of this effort is to facilitate further research on LOC as well as the development of technology solutions for LOC prevention and recovery. The authors therefore plan to make the data and analysis files available online so that the LOC analysis of this study can be openly investigated and additional LOC studies can be performed by other groups. Data files include the aircraft accident dataset described in Section III-A, accident summaries used in the analysis, and the full accident reports that have been obtained. Analysis products from the work described in Section III-B include the analysis spreadsheet used to identify precursor sequences for the accidents in the data set, the spreadsheets used to organize the data for generating worst-case precursor combinations and sequences, and the references sited as being applicable to potentially addressing each accident or incident. We also hope to develop an intelligent interface with links that enable querying the analysis results of this study. For example, clicking on a worstcase precursor combination sphere shown in Fig. B-1 would enable seeing lower level combinations (such as those shown in Fig. B-2 ) as well as a listing of which accidents and incidents from the set are represented in that combination.
B. Future Potential Risks
In developing technology solutions for LOC prevention and recovery, it is not only important to understand current causal and contributing factors (or precursors) but also future potential risks. The identification of future potential LOC risks is more difficult than current risks because there is no data that can be analyzed. Future potential LOC risks will be identified by the authors by considering current trends and future directions. A preliminary set of future potential LOC risks was identified in Ref. 10 , and is repeated here for convenience in Table 4 . Some of the trends / directions identified in Table 4 result from the NextGen Operations concept 25, 26 being developed for the next generation of the air transportation system. Specifically, future directions 4, 7, 8, and 9 relate to NextGen Operations. Although NextGen operations will ultimately improve safety, any change has the potential to introduce unintended risks. The intention here is to identify these future potential risks in an effort to proactively address these in technology solutions that are effective mitigations of both current and future LOC risks.
Another current trend / future direction is the introduction of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS). In this case, LOC risks can relate to the UAS as well as manned vehicles as a result of unexpected near-miss events involving UAS. Relative to Table 4 , future direction 9 includes risks associated with UAS operation near airports and we are already experiencing an increase in this risk 27, 28, 29 . Other risks related to UAS LOC pertain to ground infrastructure and loss of life in developed areas. These will directly relate to intended use cases for UAS by industry, government agencies, and academia, and the effectiveness (and far-sightedness) of regulations for UAS in the NAS developed by the FAA. This is an expanding market with many use cases already identified and many more to come. Some current potential use cases for UAS include search and rescue support, border patrol, infrastructure inspection, and package delivery. These and future potential use cases will need to be studied to identify future potential risks related to safety and security (including LOC).
Increasing levels of autonomy in civil aviation 30 is another current trend / future direction that could potentially impact future LOC risk. This risk relates to future direction 3 in Table 4 .
C. LOC Test Scenarios
Once the accident / incident analysis of section III and the future potential risks identified as discussed in Section IV-B are completed, a comprehensive set of hazards-based LOC test scenarios will be developed based on the current and future analysis results. It is anticipated that the test scenarios will include multiple precursor hazards, including adverse vehicle conditions, inappropriate crew response, external hazards and disturbances, and vehicle upset conditions. The test scenarios will include recommended evaluation methods, and flight conditions. The test scenarios will be developed with traceability to the current and future hazards sets for use in resilience testing. This traceability enables the evaluation of hazards coverage and technology effectiveness in providing that coverage. Figure 7 illustrates this concept. A preliminary set of hazards-based test scenarios was developed in Ref. 10 to support the validation of safetycritical systems developed for LOC prevention and recovery. The authors intend that the hazards-based test scenarios to be developed as part of this study can be utilized as a universal set of test scenarios for resilience testing of technologies for future safety-critical autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicle systems.
V. LOC and Resilience Implications for Future Aircraft Systems
LOC prevention and recovery is a key requirement for future resilient and autonomous aircraft systems as well as for the safe integration of UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS). Research and technology development needs are discussed in the following subsections.
A. LOC Prevention and Recovery for Future Resilient Autonomous Aircraft Systems
LOC prevention and recovery is a critical capability for future safety-critical autonomous and semi-autonomous aircraft systems. In particular, current and future LOC hazards and the hazards-based test scenarios described in Section IV provide a rich set of conditions for evaluating resilience under uncertain, unexpected, and hazardous conditions. Figure 8 illustrates the importance of resilience for key aviation goals within the NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) that will enable transformative capabilities in the future aviation system. More detailed technology development and validation requirements for resilient autonomous and semi-autonomous systems are provided in Appendix E. 
B. LOC Implications for Safe UAS Integration into the National Airspace System (NAS)
Research is currently underway in analyzing UAS accidents and incidents utilizing the LOC analysis methodology of Section III to UAS. As discussed in Section IV, future potential safety risks associated with UAS operation in the NAS and hazards-based test scenarios for evaluating system resilience will also be developed with a focus on UAS relative to LOC as well as to a broader set of hazards. Figure 9 depicts the current strategy for safety/risk analysis research. An analysis of current hazards will be based on an analysis of civil and military UAS mishaps similar to the approach described in Section III. Future hazards will be identified based on concepts of operation for UAS Traffic Management (UTM) Systems, UTM flight demonstrations, use cases identified by UAS operators, and relevant information obtained from the FAA and NTSB. Hazards-based test scenarios will be developed with traceability to the current and future hazards as described in Section IV. Risk modeling and analyses will utilize trajectory prediction models developed for off-nominal conditions (including LOC hazards). Monte Carlo simulation techniques will be utilized to characterize impact point predictions under nominal and off-nominal conditions, various levels of urban development, and various levels of NAS usage. Probabilistic risk models are also being considered for evaluating the effectiveness of contingency management strategies at the UTM system as well as the vehicle level. Flight testing will be performed to introduce safety risks and evaluate the effectiveness of contingency responses. Safety cases will be developed at various levels of UTM system development, including in support of flight demonstrations, for assessing UTM software, and more broadly for UAS operation in the NAS. A level of confidence assessment will provide a measure of the level of confidence associated with the UAS safety case to be developed.
VI. Conclusion
This paper presented an analysis approach to evaluate LOC accidents and incidents for the purpose of developing technology solutions that enable LOC prevention and recovery under a wide spectrum of relevant hazards. The analysis approach identifies precursor / hazards sequences, worst case hazards combinations, and key attributes (e.g., crew distraction and human-machine interface issues) associated with each LOC accident or incident. This analysis process was illustrated for eight accidents and incidents (from a defined set of accidents and incidents over a recent 15-year period) involving blocked pitot tube or static ports. Five of these mishaps were fatal accidents, and the remaining three mishaps were non-fatal incidents. The analysis developed precursor sequences and hazards combinations to compare and contrast the fatal with the non-fatal mishaps. An evaluation of the precursor sequences included a number of observations, including the initiating event (3/8 started from an "Improper Maintenance Action / Inaction," 4/8 were initiated from pitot tube icing, and 1/8 was undetermined) and common features of the fatal and non-fatal mishaps. The fatal accidents had the following key features: 1.) 3/5 were characterized by "Improper / Ineffective Recovery;" 2.) 5/5 experienced a serious vehicle upset condition, with 4/5 involving a "Stall / Departure," and 1/5 entering into an "Uncontrolled Descent;" 3.) 3/5 involved flight deck instrumentation and/or auto-flight system issues (e.g., operational errors or inadequacies); and 4.) 4/5 cases also involved "Loss of Awareness" by the crew associated with the aircraft / system, energy, or attitude state. The non-fatal incidents involved vehicle upsets, but only one entered into a stall. Only one non-fatal incident involved "Loss of Awareness." There were still pilot issues for the non-fatal incidents, but these involved fewer occurrences and varieties of crew error.
In general, the fatal accidents appear to be more complicated (i.e., involving more precursors and precursor combinations) than the nonfatal incidents. A comparison of event complexity was performed by analyzing the worst case precursor combinations using 3-D scatter plots. The fatal accidents involved numerous multiple hazards combinations, and the non-fatal incidents were clearly less complex. Comments and flags identifying key attributes of each mishaps were also evaluated. In three of the five fatal accidents, the crew was distracted or overwhelmed by conditions related to the pitot system failure (with one of these accidents exacerbated by the presence of cabin crew in the cockpit). Four of the five fatal accidents involved potential human-machine interface issues, with the accident report for the fifth accident not having enough information to make this determination. In some cases the auto-flight system flew the aircraft into stall (due to the erroneous airspeed indications), and flight deck instrumentation provided little information for improved situation awareness and no guidance on appropriate actions to take. Moreover, in some instances multiple conflicting warnings and alerts were sounding simultaneously -which further confused the crew. By comparison, none of the non-fatal incidents involved crew distraction. Although the onboard systems provided similar opportunities for confusion or to further exacerbate the situation, the comparatively less complex hazards profile enabled the pilots to successfully recover to a safe flight condition.
Comparing the fatal and nonfatal mishaps of this study, it can be concluded that there is a level of hazards complexity at which pilots (or any human) become confused and are unable to respond effectively. Moreover, current systems are essentially designed for nominal conditions and either disengage or respond inappropriately (adding additional confusion and complexity to the situation). Some potential mitigation strategies to prevent these kinds of mishaps in the future include: 1.) Improved pilot training relative to diagnosing and mitigating onboard system failures (including sensor system failures and use of alternate instrumentation); 2.) Improved crew training under unexpected and abnormal conditions (including multiple hazards events) and in the implications of existing protections associated with system operational modes; 3.) Sensor integrity management system capable of detecting, identifying and mitigating sensor system failures (including blocked pitot tube or static ports and common mode sensor failures); 4.) Improved algorithms and displays that provide improved situational awareness to the systems and crew under multiple hazards conditions; 5.) Resilient flight control system capable of ensuring flight safety under multiple hazards (including system failures, external disturbances, and inappropriate control inputs by the crew and/or autoflight systems); and 6.) Resilient upset recovery system capable of providing guidance for and/or automatic recovery from upset conditions (including stall) under multiple hazards conditions. Percent occurrences of individual hazards were also summarized for the 122 mishaps analyzed to date from the set of 278 mishaps. Hazards related to Vehicle Upsets associated with uncontrolled descent and stall / departure have occurred in 34% and 30% of the mishaps analyzed thus far. Hazards related to Adverse Onboard Conditions include Vehicle Impairment (with airframe structural damage dominating at 25%), System & Component Failures (fairly evenly distributed at 10-15% across six of the seven hazards contained therein), and Crew Action / Inaction (with loss of attitude state awareness, improper procedure, inadequate crew resource monitoring / management, ineffective recovery, and loss of energy state awareness all occurring most often ranging from 17% to 27%).
Further work will include the identification of future potential LOC hazards and the development of hazards-based test scenarios for the resilience evaluation of future semi-autonomous and autonomous systems developed for LOC prevention and recovery. This work is highly relevant to UAS and their safe operation in the NAS. An approach for assessing UAS safety and risk was also discussed. Worst case precursor sequences are illustrated in Figure C .3 for events initiated by system and component failures, and in Figure C .4 for events initiated by inappropriate crew action (or inaction). warning design, the conditions in which airline pilots are trained and exposed to stalls during their professional training and the process of recurrent training does not generate the expected behavior in any acceptable reliable way. In its current form, recognizing the stall warning, even associated with buffet, supposes that the crew accords a minimum level of "legitimacy" to it. This then supposes sufficient previous experience of stalls, a minimum of cognitive availability and understanding of the situation, knowledge of the aeroplane (and its protection modes) and its flight physics. An examination of the current training for airline pilots does not, in general, provide convincing indications of the building and maintenance of the associated skills. More generally, the double failure of the planned procedural responses shows the limits of the current safety model. When crew action is expected, it is always supposed that they will be capable of initial control of the flight path and of a rapid diagnosis that will allow them to identify the correct entry in the dictionary of procedures. A crew can be faced with an unexpected situation leading to a momentary but profound loss of comprehension. If, in this case, the supposed capacity for initial mastery and then diagnosis is lost, the safety model is then in "common failure mode". During this event, the initial inability to master the flight path also made it impossible to understand the situation and to access the planned solution. The crew did take actions in an attempt to isolate the anomalies (such as switching from the center autopilot to the right autopilot at one point during the flight). However, this did not affect the flight management computer's use of data from the left (captain's) air data system, and the erroneous high airspeeds subsequently contributed to airplane-nose-up autopilot commands during and after the airplane's climb to FL370.
No Yes
Lack of a failure detection and notification system capable of detecting and identifying blocked pitot tubes; indistinct alerts generated by the airplane's crew alerting system, which added to the flight crew's confusion during the flight. 
